The generations of strategies can be seen as single photographs
taken at a different moments. In reality a continuous movie [9] is
playing. The selective events, as well as the inclusion of new
variation, that we can detect when comparing two generations,
have taken place somewhere between the generations. Again, in
comparison with biology, genefrequencies in genepools are
measured at certain points in time.
Step three in the approach involves the interpretation of the
found changes. In case of new variation, we can firstly ask where
did it come from (from outside the organization or was it thought
up in the organization), and if there was more variation
abundant, which was not introduced. That would mean that there
have been selective events in the acceptance of new variation,
and that other variation that was detected has been rejected. The
next question to ask then would be where in the organization did
this selection take place, and by what criteria.
In the case of deletions we can ask who has taken the decision to
delete, and by what criteria. In examples of public policy, a
distinction is possible between criteria concerning A) the way a
problem can be solved regarding the causes of the problem (to
reduce acid rain, you have to reduce the emission of substances
that cause it), B) the causal relations and normative aspects of
instruments you can use to solve the problem (to shoot the people
that are involved in the emission is illegal, and morally
unacceptable, while advising them to reduce emissions simply will
not work), as well as C) criteria regarding the political
situation in which decisions are taken. A good solution might be
selected out because the involved politicians thought that such a
decision might be bad for their career, for the electorate
situation of the party, or doesn't fit into the memetic lineages
the party sticks to (concerning ideology).
The evolution of a strategy is a process in which many selective
events take place where different sets of criteria, or different
selection pressures can be distinguished. These events cannot be
seen apart from the different 'players' that are involved in
different selective events.
Hoppe ( 1993 ) for instance, in an essay on policy argumentation
and belief systems refers to a distinction between high, middle
and low games or levels of political judgement. At the highest
level political party elites, think tanks, prestigious political
commentators and ideologues, and some top-notch public managers
debate issues on levels of rational choice and system
vindication. At the middle level the legislature, the upper and
middle levels of the executive branch, interest groups, lobbies,
journalists and spokesmen of various social and political
movements debate issues on policy design/adoption and (the
initial stages of) policy implementation. At the low levels
middle and lower-level members of the executive branch, with its
score of professionals, technicians and experts, and courts
debate issues of policy implementation and evaluation processes
including technical verification. The specific levels with
particular players and criteria are of no concern to this essay,
but they illustrate different selective systems operating on
parts of a strategy in different parts of an organization.
Hoppe seems to assume that the criteria used in decision making
at specific levels are separable. In other words, the levels are
not only distinguishable by the identity of different players,
but also by different criteria used to judge policy issues. This
means that players at the lowest level do not use criteria of
what Hoppe refers to as 'rational choice' to judge policy issues.
However, players at the middle level may anticipate the decisions
they believe will be selected out by political criteria in the
political process. In this situation the evaluating actors are
politicized, or infected by memes consisting political criteria.
In addition, politicians can use evaluative, and instrumental
criteria for the weeding out of policy issues they do not want to
get accepted because this does not suit their political
aspirations.
In a memetic perspective it matters which people use which
criteria in selective events, because it can have effects on the
evolutionary learning potential of an organization with regard to
achieving its goals. For instance if new variation in solutions
is weeded out by the political process, there will be less chance
that new successful solutions will be encountered.
An evolving strategy and memetic selection
I would like to recall some memetic insights and concepts in our
approach for the evolution of a strategy.
First the planned actions in a strategy are instructions that can
steer the organization toward reaching its goals. In this way the
class of planned actions is analogous in its instructional nature
to the genotype of an organism, while the class of actually
executed actions is analogous to the characteristics of the
phenotype (Hull, 1988a ). The goals in the strategy are based upon
problems to be solved, being a selective system (Campbell, 1974)
for the organization. Thus a strategy is seen as instructional
toward dealing with selective forces.
Secondly, a strategy is followed through time as an evolving
memetic entity. Without loosing sight of the causal actors that
are involved in all kinds of processes that influence the
evolution of the strategy, the main focus of the approach is on a
strategy as an entity of its own. This entity reflects agreed
upon or social knowledge about what problems are, what actions
should be taken, and the causal connections between those two.
A third point is that the different parts of a strategy can
change (more or less) independently in time, involving new
variation, and deletions by selective events. When new variation
appears we can ask where the new memes came from, why they, and
not others, were selected, why they were not selected before if
they were already present for a longer time, etc. When deletions
occur we can ask where and by whom they were weeded out, and by
what criteria. These questions about variation and selection of
parts of the strategy are connected to memetic questions in two
ways. First there are questions about the particular routes memes
have taken through a unit-pool, or from unit-pool to unit-pool.
Secondly there are questions about what selection criteria have
been used, and by whom.
The last memetic focus is about evolutionary learning occurring
between generations of the strategy. As mentioned before,
selective events as such do not guarantee that there is any kind
of evolutionary learning.
In a strategy that has relatively stable goals (compared to the
speed with which new knowledge can be acquired) a kind of
evolutionary learning can take place. Any problem which a
strategy aims to solve, has causal relations that determine what
things must be changed to solve it (the emission of acid
substances must be changed to solve the acid rain problem). In
the case of acid rain, a considerable amount of scientific
research has been done to be able to establish which causal
relations can, and which can't be influenced. This research can
be said to contain a large amount of trial and error learning, in
the quality of scientific experiments. This acquired knowledge is
used by the makers of acid rain policy to determine and explain
what approaches are and are not viable. This example shows that
over time, knowledge about the problem can accumulate, and be
shared by memetic transmission. In the same way knowledge
accumulates about what policy instruments are useful in what
conditions. Here policymakers in environmental policy can learn
from the trials with those instruments in other policy fields.
In this sense we can say that the body of knowledge that connects
the actions with the goals in a strategy can evolve by selective
evolution, including evolutionary learning transmitted by memetic
processes. However other selective events can actually counteract
evolutionary learning. For instance the weeding out of possible
variation in the political process can counteract evolutionary
learning towards the goals in strategy.
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