Publishing house: Fahrenheit 451,Campo de' Fiori 44 -
Roma.
Montag is the hero of the novel Fahrenheit 451
(R.Bradbury), whose plot
deals with a fictional society where books are all burnt.
Montag, together
with other clandestines, keeps the contents of books in mind
in order not to
lose them.
Brunella Antomarini at Brunella@uni.net, invited me to answer
the five questions below. Questions about the volumes of MON-
TAG can be mailed to her.
The first volume is scheduled this year,
but alas it will be in Italian only. Therefore I have the
original English version
right below. The Italian version can be found
here
Questions:
1. Is the memes' theory a scientific theory? That is,
could we say
it is an analogical theory - meant to arrive to a
biological law similar to the genetic one - or a metaphoric
theory - using the gene-theory as just an explicatory aid?
2. But,according to this perspective, isn't the act of
knowing
totally replaced with the memes' representation of
knowledge? If even knowing is just memes resulting stronger
than others,
isn't this theory itself such a representation? What is
left of
the relationship with concrete things?
3. Isn't the model of natural selection - and that of
mutation -
a weak means to explain the way fast-changing
ideas are spread? Doesn't intention have a more plausible
role in transmission of ideas?
4. What kind of entities are memes?Are they
material entities entering minds?
If there's anything outside the mind, which is
not biologically verifiable, how can they ever enter the
mind?
5. Do memes imprint themselves on the brains?
If so, isn't their diffusion intentional?
Question:
1. Is the memes' theory a scientific theory? That is,
could we say
it is an analogical theory - meant to arrive to a
biological law similar to the genetic one - or a metaphoric
theory - using the gene-theory as just an explicatory aid?
Answer:
First of all, let us look at the question. In general
metaphor
is used as being broader than analogy. In this way analogy
seems to refer to a law in biology, and metaphor to an
explanatory aid.
I think it can be used as you please. In my opinion biology
does
not have many laws, and certainly no laws in the way
physics has them.
But aside from this, my efforts are not to arrive at any
laws of
biology. Memes are in the realm from behavior to thought so
it depends
how broad you take biology to be.
I think that in the common sense of the word, they are
not in
the realm of biology, since genetics has little to do with
memes,
apart for the fact that the things memes are in, are
biological,
and that parts of these things (things are organisms) can
be
determined by genes to a large or small extent to take up
memes without too much
interference by intentions.
I think that the most positive way to look at it is
that the memetic
perspective, both the virus-metaphor, and the selective
metaphor,
can be an aid to understand otherwise difficult to
understand phenomena. That would be more metaphoric I
think.
This does not mean that the theory about the structure of
thought
is very analogical to biological theory, especially
the Darwinian theory. By the virus metaphor I mean the
memetic
perspective that Dawkins takes, where memes spread without
much
resistance.
By the selective perspective I mean the perspective
where there is
a focus on selection of memes; people can and do resist
ideas, especially when those ideas prescribe them to behave
in ways
they don't like, or if those ideas tell them to agree on
morally wrong
ideas, in their judgement.
Question:
2. But,according to this perspective, isn't the act of
knowing
totally replaced with the memes' representation of
knowledge? If even knowing is just memes resulting stronger
than others,
isn't this theory itself such a representation? What is
left of
the relationship with concrete things?
Answer:
No, the act of knowing is not totally replaced with the
memes
perspective of knowledge.
The human is the one who does the knowing, the meme is
replicated.
It is possible that humans accept and use memes without
knowing they
do, but still the memes do not do anything. My phrase to
state this
is that 'humans do, memes don't'.
The theory of memes is such a representation, but memes
are not only
representations.
In my opinion memes can be 'ways of thought', which can connote to a
way to
represent. But memes can also be behavioral patterns.
Mothers
teach children, sometimes quite intentionally, not to steal
money
or candy [and so do fathers]. The pattern of behavior, or
rather
the forbiddance of a pattern is replicated to the child by
punishment, or otherwise. That is not really a representa
tion.
In the same way, songs in the hitparade are replicated,
and they are not a way of representation. In the same way,
the attachment of emotions to certain stimuli is replicated
by movies. We all cry if we see some scene from a touching
movie.
First of all because it reminds us of emotional events, but
later
this can be strengthened by the fact that everybody knows
the movie,
and the reference to that scene can become a 'sign' to feel
the emotion.
The most fascinating examples for me are the way memes
shape government
processes. Ways of financing are replicated, for instance
because the
actor that gives money requires you to order your finances
in a
specific way, so he can compare different requests for the
money
he supplies.
If you don't follow his instructions, he will not give
you money.
I am still thinking about more examples, and what the
memetic
perspective can add to what I already knew.
Question:
3. Isn't the model of natural selection - and that of
mutation -
a weak means to explain the way fast-changing
ideas are spread? Doesn't intention have a more plausible
role in transmission of ideas?
Answer:
The model of mutation is not weak. Let us look at
biology. We have all kinds of mutations: point mutations
are the
first kind that people probably will associate with muta
tions. But
we have chromosomal mutations, we have inversions, we have
crossing over [technically not really a mutation], there
are
processes in which chromosomes are doubled, where double
chromosomes
are cut up again, etc, etc.
There are a lot of mutations, some very strong in
changing genes, and
some not. So I doubt if the model of mutation is weak.
Take a textbook like Susuki, an introduction to genetics,
or some
title like that,and read it! You will be amazed how much of
mutation is possible.
And now that I am talking about books, no philosopher
that thinks about memetics can go through life without
reading David
Hull. Because David Hull is one who does not write too
much, he
writes his things with a great feeling for clear defini
tions,
and knows about biology, and memetics.(Footnote about
Hull).
Now to the 'way fast changing ideas are spread'.
First of all memes are not only ideas. But secondly the
question
is twofold; mentioned are spreading memes and fast-changing
memes.
These are two very different matters.
In populations of bacteria genes can spread very fast
from individual
bacteria to other bacteria, for instance by plasmids [li
ttle
circle-shaped pieces of dna, that have no direct function
in mitosis
etc, ].In the same way viruses can spread very fast through
a
host population. So this analogy is no problem.
Fast-changing memes are another matter. They are the
thing you focus
on when speaking about mutation-types. Ideas can stick
together in
complexes, that are copied from individual to individual in
one
complex. That is the idea of a meme. But memes can be shuf
fled with
other memes, in the brain, for some purpose, or without
clear
purpose. It is clear that the mechanisms working in this
are
different from the mechanisms of genetic re-shuffling. In
many ways,
that are fundamental. That should be clear. But is it this
process
more extensive, are memes more radically altered than
genes? I do not
know how I should measure two processes that are so dif
ferent in
their mechanisms. Especially since we know so little about
how ideas
are processed in brains [the mind-body problem].
Intention, I would say, does play a role, but the
question is
strange. Tell me what intentions are, tell me what free
will is.
There are libraries full about these questions. Second, as
mentioned,
memes are not only ideas.
Ideas can be re-shuffled by intentional thought.
But they can also be re-shuffled by rather unconscious
processes, That
is, we normally don't know how we instantly see that ideas
don't
fit together. We don't know how creative processes work
exactly.
Should we call that intentional?
Another example. Do we choose what we see as good
and bad? Do we really choose what we think of as 'proper',
or
'morally good'? I think we have little choice in that. We
seem to copy
what we see as good from our parents, or from the papers.
Furthermore,
we do not think about the dichotomy of 'good and bad', we
just use
it. Why don't we use very good, a bit good, a bit worse, a
bit bad,
very bad, and dead-evil? Why do we use a dichotomy, and not
a
threechotomy, or more numbers?
We do not choose, we copy. And we keep doing that main
ly because
we do not see that we could choose.
So do intentions play a part in memetic evolution?
Yes, they do, but often they don't. Is it impossible for
intentions
to play a part, where they don't at a certain moment?
Probably
not, but still it doesn't happen as far as I can see.
By the way, memes are of course transmitted by brains,
along with
some other things, but we cannot think that we
automatically have intentional influence on what our brains
transmit.
The things brains do are not always intentional.
Footnote:_________________________________________________
____
Hull DL (1980) Individuality and selection.
Ann. Rev. Ecol.Syst., 11, 311-332
Hull DL (1982) The naked meme. In Plotkin HC
(ed.) Learning Development and culture, essays in evolu
tionary
epistemology.John Wiley & Sons.
Hull DL (1988a) A mechanism and its
metaphysics: an evolutionary account of the social and
conceptual
development of science. Biology and Philosophy 3,
123-155
Hull DL (1988b) Interactors versus vehicles.In:
Plotkin HC
(ed) The role of behavior in evolution, MIT Press.
___________________________________________________________
Question:
4. What kind of entities are memes?Are they
material entities entering minds?
If there's anything outside the mind, which is
not biologically verifiable, how can they ever enter the
mind?
Answer:
I think they are material entities. I say think, be
cause I don't
know how thoughts in general are located or translated in
the brain,
in patterns, material structure or anything like that. I
think nobody
knows. I believe that memes are in some way material, mean
ing that
there must be a way in which memes, like any other thought,
memory,
etc are somehow stored in the brain. They are given a mean
ing,
in the sense that they are connected to an environment of
other
thoughts, or at least concepts in which the make sense in
the
meaning of memes being ideas.
If memes are behavioral patterns that are learned,
without a
necessary translation in words, the storage could
be different, or not, I do not know that. One thing is for
sure,
behavioral patterns, are copied by means of learning
processes for
instance from parents to children. If you learn your child
not to be
rude, you are teaching him a meme. If you do that by ex
plaining it in
words, you use words and thus ideas to help the copying
process, if you
just slap him if he does something wrong, as in the way you
train dogs
[no intention meant to say that you should] ideas are not
needed, and straight conditioning takes over from words as
memes. In
this sense memes are not only a way to comprehend, but are
material [if
you include pattern as material] entities, that are real in
a
biological sense.
The question arises here if that is all they are.
I think not. As in a biological theory, the way we describe
what memes
are is a method of comprehension, like any theory, and thus
the
theory of memes, or theories of memes are a way to struc
ture phenomena
in the minds of scientists or any other humans that think
by means
of theories.
I do not think that one excludes the other.
Question:
5. Do memes imprint themselves on the brains?
If so, isn't their diffusion intentional?
Answer:
How can memes enter minds. Well in the same way
that sound enters minds. In the same way in which light
enters
minds. How? I think nobody knows. In all these cases the
question is
relevant, but I am not sure someone has the answer. In my
book, the
question should not be how it enters minds, that is by the
senses, but
how the hell it is translated into understanding. How do we
know what
sound means? How do we interpret light patterns, when a big
lion
attacks us? How do we know that there is a lion in a case
when
somebody tells us. How is it that we understand those
words, and are
careful to stay away from the bars even if we cannot see
that lion
right away? I don't know. I do know that we can, and thus
think there
must be a way we do that.
Are there intentions involved? In general we over
emphasise that.
If we see the lion without knowing that he was there, and
we were
dangerously close, we would be instantly scared, and that
memory
would stay with us for a while. So the brain can be seen as
being
more ready to memorize some events, rather than other ones.
But
do memes actively imprint themselves?
I think not. They are imprinted because we interact
with other
humans, and are susceptible to their influence.
But memes themselves are just sitting, being more, or less
copied,
dependent on the copying processes that humans are involved
in.
Does that mean that we are always intentionally copying?
No, I don't think so.
Back to
Memetics
Back to
Evolution
Back to
Hans-Cees
