A short comment from a biologist on William Benzon's essay ' Culture as an Evolutionary Arena'

Note: This article is published in the Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems.
as

Speel, H.C.A.M. (1997) A short comment from a biologist. Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems 20 (3): 309-322
Copyright © 1996 Hans-Cees Speel. All Rights Reserved.

Hans-Cees Speel, hanscees@hanscees.comGraduate Research Assistant, Dept. of Policy Analysis, Delft University of Technology, Jaffalaan 5 PO Box 55015 2600 GA Delft, The Netherlands. E-mail hanscees@hanscees.com

Introduction

Many biologists have written on issues of cultural evolution from the 'memetic' point of view. The starting-point for their theories is the definition of both gene and meme as replicators. If we indeed value new classifications and theories more when they are connected to other, generally accepted theories, then cultural evolutionary theories which include memetic views have potency. Evolutionary theories in biological sciences are accepted, and the memetic view is strongly analogous to the structure of those theories. However, memetics cannot grow without serious attention from non-biologists studying cultural evolution. Therefore, I was happy to see William Benzon's essay integrating the memetics view on cultural evolution with views from other disciplines. Benzon's article focuses on cultural evolution, drawing examples form biological evolution for comparison. In this short reply, I shall present ideas formed in biological theory with regard to the meme-gene analogy.

My reply concerns four issues. (1) I will negate the statement that biologists agree that classification should reflect phylogeny. (2) I will comment on the examples Benzon uses with respect to biological evolution. I will argue that the view that only species can be considered evolutionary systems is too limited. (3) I will expand on the use of the concept meme as a replicator, introducing concepts as interactor and selective retention system. (4) I will reply to his view on the genotype-phenotype concept. I will argue that his use of these concepts is incompatible with the replicator view as used in biology. (5) A final remark concerns the comparison Benzon makes between the complexity of cultural and biological evolutionary systems.

1. Biologists, classification and phylogeny.

The first issue I would like to challenge, is that all biologists agree on the view that taxonomic classification must reflect phylogeny. This means that classification trees should reflect descent. Hull's (1988b) book On the social and conceptual development of science shows that not all biologists hold this view. The views of different schools that do not hold this view vary from acknowledging evolution as important, but not a practical base of knowledge on which classification can be based, to the view that classification is a discipline with its own value regardless of evolutionary theories. Benzon refers only to those that do hold the view that taxonomic classification must reflect phylogeny, for instance Mayr, leaving out members of other schools of thought.

2. Biological evolutionary theory and species

Benzon uses species as the sole example of biological evolutionary theory. However, Hull (1982, 1988a, b) states that although species might be the 'paradigm example' of evolution by natural selection, we are biased in this regard. Species are by definition sexually reproductive units, but most organisms reproduce asexually and cannot be classified as species per se. Examples are bacteria, viruses, and many plants and lower animals. Thus, only to speak of species as examples of evolutionary biology is not representative of empirical reality. Asexual reproduction is very important in biology. Borrowing is more common in the asexually then in sexually reproducing organisms. Therefore, it must not be overlooked in the discussion of the prevalence of borrowing in biological and cultural evolution.

In biology, viruses can transmit genes over lineage-boundaries, and in bacteria plasmids are exchanged between strains. Benzon mentions that some plant species may mix their gene-pools and that animals now also are suspect of this. Because borrowing is so extensive in 'lower' organisms biologists often cannot use the classification rules that were developed to classify species. Based on these observations I want to assert that cross-lineage borrowing (Campbell, 1965), or multi-parental transmission (Boulding, 1978; Boyd and Richerson, 1985) are not a difference in kind between cultural and biological evolution. As Hull (1982) states, the only difference in kind between biological and cultural evolution is intentionality, and currently I think he is right.

3. Evolution, replication, interaction and selective retention

Benzon uses the concept meme from Dawkins (1976), and also states that physical memes are dispersed. By saying this, he seems to accept Dawkins' view of memes as replicators. Replicators are units of information that are copied, or in other words replicated. However, replication alone cannot describe evolution. Hull (1982, 1988a) has expanded the replication concept with processes of interaction. Together with interaction, replication can generate evolution by either natural or artificial selection, be it intentional or not. Selective retention systems (Campbell, 1974), sexually reproducing or not, show adaptation because there is interaction and thus selection. In cultural evolution this expansion of the interaction concept to the replication view does not always play a role, while in biological evolutionary views selection is almost always pre-supposed (Speel, 1996). Using this elaborated abstract view on evolution the following sentences of Benzon can be amended:

'I take it that the first requirement for understanding culture as an evolutionary domain is to find suitable parallels to the biological concepts of gene, phenotype, environment, and species. We need something like the genes to vary, be replicated, and passed on from generation to generation. We need something like the phenotype to adapt to the cultural environment. And we need something like the species to bear the collection of genes which creates the adapting phenotype'.

This becomes:

I take it that the first requirement for understanding culture as an evolutionary domain is to find suitable parallels to the biological concepts of replicator, interactor, environment, and retention system. We need replicators to vary, and to be passed on from generation to generation. We need interactors to compete in the cultural environment. And we need something like a retention system to hold the collection of memes and in which adaption can take place.

The beauty of using the concepts replication and interaction in biological evolutionary theory is that it allows us to omit the view that evolution is restricted to species, and to describe evolutionary mechanisms in general. It has led to an hierarchical view on evolution (Brandon, 1988) where both asexually and sexually reproducing organisms can be described in the same theoretical framework. In biological evolutionary theory, replication is used together with interaction to describe evolutionary processes. I suggest that we do the same in cultural evolutionary theory. The biological parallel of the replicator gene is the replicator meme which is passed on from generation to generation, but also from human to human, or from culture to culture. Of course, it is not the phenotype which adapts itself but the selective retention system. In theories concerning humans, such systems can be the mind or a society, but also an organization or a discipline in science. Accordingly, phenotypes can be represented as traits, ideas or physical artifacts which interact in selective events. In other words, a phenotype is the element that interacts with the selective environment. The next section elaborates on the geno-phenotype distinction.

4. The genotype-phenotype distinction.

Benzon proposes that psychological traits in the brain form the phenotype in memetic evolution, and that physical memes should be seen as the genotype. Several other authors have written about the phenotype issue (Plotkin and Odling-Smee, 1982) and about what the phenotype should consist of in memetic evolution (Heyes and Plotkin, 1989; Hull, 1982). I would like to use the replicator-interactor-lineage model to explain my point of view. In my terminology the memetic counterparts of genotype and phenotype are respectively, the "memo-type" and the "phemotype". Even though Benzon does use the meme concept by Dawkins, he denies that memes can be located in the brain (Benzon, pers. comm.). These two views are inconsistent. Dawkins defines memes as replicators. Following this line of thought, memes should be defined as any unit of culture that is copied, be it from human to human, from culture to culture, or otherwise. Benzon's physical memes do get dispersed over cultures and thus they comply with Dawkins definition. However, I think memes in the brain are replicators as well. In my view, it is clear that ideas, songs and norms reside in the brain somehow, as they are copied as units from human to human, but also from brains to books, or to physical air-waves. These observations of replications define them as memes that are located in the brain. Thus I argue that under the definition which makes physical memes replicators, brain-memes are also replicators. The view that brain memes are units of evolution is consistent with Dennet (1991) and Lynch (1996).

Benzon considers physical memes to be the memotype, and psychological traits to be the phemotype. I think that this division is not correct. In biological theory, genes are replicators that do not interact with the environment. Almost all replicators in biological theory are genotype. Traits, or parts of the phenotype are the structures that are decisive in interaction. Thus in biological theory interactors belong to the phenotype, and replicators to the genotype. Interaction takes place with regard to the selective environment (Brandon, 1988). Unless there are severe reasons not to, the theoretical connections between replicators and genotype and interactors and phenotype in biology, should be followed when defining equivalent concepts in cultural evolution.

By definition, environments are considered to be selective if there is a kind of competition or weeding out. In compliance with Benzon's terminology, we could call a selective environment also an arena. In biological evolution, species are subject to selective processes in many arenas. Sperm-cells compete for egg-cells, males compete for females, females and males compete for their genes to be reproduced, genes involved in "meiotic drive" can compete by intra-cellular traits for replication into sex-cells (Ridley, 1993). Thus many arenas can be distinguished in which many selection processes take place, possibly at the same time. I see no reason why cultural evolution cannot be described with multiple arenas as well. Physical and brain memes can be replicators and they can both interact in different arenas. However, when they interact they should be considered phemotype, and when they are replicated they form the memotype. When Benzon states that psychological traits in the brain are phemotype this means by definition that parts of those traits can serve as interactors. I am not quite sure what Benzon considers psychological traits to be, and if he means that those traits are interacting. But I do agree that a "trait" like an emotional attachment to norms is not copied directly and thus cannot be considered to be a meme.

In the preceding paragraphs I have taken the view that memes in the brain can be interactors but also replicators. This is because replicators and interactors are definitions of process. The very same norm, or dispersed idea, can act as a replicator in one case and as an interactor in another. Norms are dispersed among humans by replication, and sometimes replicated from culture to culture. But ones established in a culture, these same norms can prevent other norms from entering the culture of which they have become a part. In this example such norms act as replicators first, and then as interactors, which compete with new incoming norms. In summary, Benzon's proposal that psychological traits are phemotype, and physical memes are memotype seems to be inconsistent with the underlying definitions from biological evolutionary theory. It is the role cultural units play in the evolutionary process which determines if they should be considered one or the other.

5. Is culture a more complex phenomenon than life?

The very last issue I want to address is a small one, but one I have seen many times before. Therefore I would like to comment on it. Benzon states in his last paragraphs:
If cultural taxonomy is more complex and various in structure than biological taxonomy that is surely because culture is a more complex phenomenon than life. Memes and traits flow between paradigms more freely than genes and phenotypes flow between species. Abstract cultural space is richer than abstract biological space.

I do not know if cultural taxonomy is more complex than biological taxonomy and do not think that phenotypes can flow between species. However, the next sentence seems to be the common belief of non-biologists: 'Culture is a more complex phenomenon than life'. Sometimes I hear statements as 'human processes are more complex than biological processes'. I can only hope these are not seriously meant. My critique follows several lines. With regard to method, the measurement tools must be indicated when we make comparisons. Can we compare the evolution of culture and biological evolution with the same measurement device? If we cannot, the statement above is useless. Second, what is this 'life' that is being compared? And should we regard the evolution of one species more complex than the evolution of a culture? Or than the evolution of multi-species systems, or the evolution of eco-systems? Is a handful of soil with millions of bacteria that react to micro-climates and belong to thousands or more strains less complex than the evolution of culture? I do not support the statement that culture is more complex than life, but would be interested if anyone would attempt to compare this in a useful and valid manner. My interpretation of Benzon's statement is that culture is a specific domain of research; that intentionality is more present in culture than in biological objects of research; and that language with words, concepts and logic found in human interaction is not present in the objects of biological evolutionary research.

Conclusion

In conclusion, part of Benzon's article is an attempt to compare cultural and biological evolutionary processes. He states that we have a long way to go doing this and I think progress can be made. The integration of the concepts replicators, interactors and selective retention systems can be useful in the study of cultural evolution. If we want to make the effort worthwhile, it would be wise to involve both cultural and biological scientists and their insights. I fully agree with the last statement of Benzon:
We have plenty of good work yet ahead, and a measure of pleasure as well.

Acknowledgements

I thank William Benzon for his valuable critique on earlier versions and Martine van der Ploeg for improving my English.

References

Boulding, K.E. (1978) Ecodynamics: a new theory of societal evolution. Sage publications, London.

Boyd, R. and Richerson, P.J. (1985) Culture and the evolutionary process. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Brandon, R.N. (1988) The levels of selection: A hierarchy of interactors. In: Plotkin, H.C. (ed) The role of behavior in evolution, MIT Press.

Campbell DT (1965) Variation and selective retention in socio-cultural evolution. In: Barringer, H.R.; Blanksten, G.I. and Mack, R.W. (ed) Social change in developing areas, a reinterpretation of evolutionary theory. Schenkman publishing company, Cambridge Massachusetts.

Campbell, D.T. (1974) Evolutionary epistemology. In: Schlipp, P.A. (ed) The philosophy of Karl Popper. The Library of Living Philosophers volume XIV.

Dawkins, R. (1976) The selfish gene. Oxford university press.

Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness explained. Penguin Books.

Heyes, C.M. and Plotkin, H.C. (1989) Replicators and interactors in cultural evolution. In: Ruse, M. (ed) What the philosophy of biology is; essays dedicated to David Hull. Kluwer academic publishers Dordrecht.

Hull, D.L. (1982) The naked meme. In: Plotkin, H.C. (ed.) Learning Development and culture, essays in evolutionary epistemology. John Wiley & Sons.

Hull, D.L. (1988a) Interactors versus vehicles. In: Plotkin, H.C. (ed) The role of behavior in evolution. MIT Press.

Hull, D.L. (1988b) Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science. The University of Chicago Press.

Plotkin, H.C. and Odling-Smee, F.J. (1982) Learning in the context of a hierarchy of knowledge gaining processes. In: Plotkin, H.C. (ed.) Learning Development and culture, essays in evolutionary epistemology. John Wiley & Sons.

Lynch, A.(1996) Thought contagion. How belief spreads through society. Basic Books.

Ridley, M. (1993) Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature. Viking.

Speel, H.C.A.M. (1996) Memetics: On a conceptual framework for cultural evolution. In: Heylighen, F. and Aerts, D. (ed) The Evolution of Complexity. Kluwer, Dordrecht, in press.

Back to Hans-Cees
Back to memetics