World-nationalism: normative globalism as pan-nationalismA world-state has no special ethical status: this paper is about the ethical claims of normative globalism. An appendix summarises the present national world order. Since this was first written, normative globalism has acquired more influence. A world government is still a long way off, but there is now an international criminal court. Written 1996, last textual revisions July 2001.
|ABSTRACT. Recent works on normative globalism or political cosmopolitanism (Held, Falk, Miller) continue a long tradition. It claims an 'ethical' status, reinforced by the usual contrast with the 'amoral' realist tradition. This is misleading. In its rejection of widely spread sovereignty or autonomy, it shares the central feature of nationalism. It is a form of pan-nationalism. The arguments for global political institutions - based on unity as value, common status, common problems, peace, and historicism - are logically flawed. They cannot justify one type of state against others. The UN, too, cannot claim any ethical superiority. The alternatives to the present world order are other world orders, not reduction to one planetary nation state.|
The idea of a world state is ancient in itself: Alexander Demandt traces it back 3450 years to Pharaoh Thutmosis III, Friedrich Berber 4350 years to Sargon of Akkad.  Nevertheless normative globalism continues to exist, and continues to claim some form of moral superiority. As at the end of the 19th century, or in the 1920's, there is a revival of interest - especially since 1989. This interest, both academic and non-academic, (reviewed by Michael Marien)  is visible in title combinations of "global" or "world", with "governance", "sustainability", "concern", "responsibility" or "future". Given the revival in normative ethics since the 1960's, the claims of normative globalism rest increasingly on ethical arguments. Many of these are accepted at face value, as is shown by their unquestioned appearance in introductory texts for students. Other than the standard objections of classic nationalism - including proletarian internationalism  - normative globalism is rarely criticised. This contributes to its image of moral superiority. The political opposition to globalism in the West does not have this image: it now comes from populists and conspiracy theorists. (It was once a feature of anti-communist propaganda). In the academic world, too, realism/nationalism forms a sort of duopoly with globalism. In fact, most of the world's population are committed both to their own national and/or ethnic identity, and to some form of religious and/or humanist idea of a universal moral community: only a small minority reject both of these.|
The "ethical" image of normative globalism is entirely false and misleading. Normative globalism is a pan-nationalism. Its current version (obviously different from the universalism of ancient theocracies) belongs firmly in the political tradition of nationalism. Many normative globalists are simply conditioned by the world of nations: their only alternative for 180 nations is one large nation. Only a nationalist, committed to the idea of political or cultural unity in some form, would see a world-nation as the end of history. 
The central characteristic of nationalism, which I will not argue further here, is its denial of sovereignty to entities other than nations or peoples. (See the appendix on the characteristics of the national world order). In practice, within all historical nation states, this abstract denial of sovereignty is visible as internal pressure for cultural, social, political and economic unity. This is replicated in the politics of normative globalists: none of them explain how to get away from the World Government, if you oppose it.
Formally the equivalence can be so stated...
Nationalism has as a central political demand the establishment of a state on a territory, exclusive of other states on that territory, populated by a group formed by involuntary membership of an inclusive category, usually 'descendants of past inhabitants of the territory'.
In this usage 'normative globalism' as movement or ideology seeks some form of planetary political unit with global authority, executive, legislative, and/or judicial.  It includes all forms of global federalism or confederalism, planetary Bundesstaat or Staatenbund. It includes proposals for global taxation, which will require such authority. It does not include political demands for increased international co-operation, which leave the present states system intact. The concept of 'global governance' seems intermediate. Some authors use it almost as a synonym for the working of the states system. In contrast, the Commission on Global Governance is a more definitively globalist institution, an example of a well-organised lobby group.  More diffuse political support for normative globalism comes from, for instance, the member groups of OneWorldOnline (mainly from English speaking countries).  In the academic world, recent comprehensive examples of normative globalism are David Held's 'Democracy and the Global Order', Lynn Miller's 'Global Order: Values and Power in International Politics' and Richard Falk's 'On Humane Governance'. 
The closest equivalent to this normative globalism, in recognised nationalism, are the pan-nationalisms - excluding however pan-Islamism, since a universal religion does not need a "pan-" prefix. The pan-nationalisms are distinguished from classic nationalism by: a less defined territory; more cultural and linguistic divisions among the population of the proposed state; more willingness to accept multi-lingualism; less emphasis on descent; and a more expansionist (pan-Germanism) or defensive (pan-Africanism) character. Aside from formal equivalence, normative globalism shares some of these characteristics. It also has specific characteristics, and internal variants. For instance, despite the extreme range of global visions reviewed by Marien, from Brzezinski to New Age, a few common features emerge:
FORMAL AND SYNCRETIC VERSIONS
There are two main forms of normative globalism. The first group are the formal world-state ideologies, such as world federalism. That includes pro-UN movements seeking a great expansion of UN powers and activity, and its de facto transformation into a form of world government. This last option has the best academic backing: the best example is the work of Richard Falk. The second variant is less recognised and formalised: normative syncretism, a term derived from the sociology of religion.  It includes what is now often called transculturality or interculturality, the fusion of cultures into hybrid forms. The present impact of syncretist ideas in Western culture is great, as visible in widespread use of prefixes such as trans-, cross-, inter-, and multi-. When syncretism is directed at the emergence of a single hybrid, it is a pan-syncretism. Given cultural trends, there will probably be more examples of the kind of global cultural pan-syncretism described (and advocated) by Jan Nederveen Pieterse.  Perhaps a world government might emerge from the increasing co-operation of small ethno-national and cultural movements, rather than from the nationalism of existing nation states. In other words, unity through fusions of the 'sub-state nationalisms' or 'subnationalisms' usually seen as disintegrative. 
The idea, that transnational actors are by-passing the nation state on the way to global governance, belongs in this syncretic category. At present it is more wish than fact. There are certainly a large number of non-governmental organisations (ngo's) with cross-border contacts, for instance the thousands linked by Internet through the Institute for Global Communications and the Association for Progressive Communications.  However, they usually work through a limited number of central 'inter-ngo's' or ingo's.  Descriptions such as "women as nonstate, antistate and transtate actors" show how such concepts can inflate to define any person as globally active.  It may be logically valid to claim that IGC and APC represent the 'true' reality of the world, superseding the states system: contesting such claims is pointless. The point is that an emotional commitment to global unity via transnationalism certainly exists, to produce for instance this description:
"Engaging corporate, state and interstate actors on a number of levels, Greenpeace's actions draw out the transversal and interrelated character of contemporary politics....Greenpeace activities traverse state boundaries and call them into question. Rather than occupying the striated spaces of state and interstate, the politics of Greenpeace seems to occupy the smooth space in between." 
Despite the unconventional language, it is the old monopoly claim of nationalism which is reproduced here: there is only one 'smooth space', and no-one can escape the transnational actors.
In syncretism there need be no paradox between fragmentation and unity. In western thought this opposition (nationalism versus globalism) is supposed to parallel the divide between for instance Herder and Kant, Romanticism and Enlightenment, or alternatively between Hegel and Kant.  However the approach in this paper places both nationalism and cosmopolitanism on one side - in opposition to alternative world orders of non-nation states. Put simply: the realist tradition is in fact part of the idealist tradition, since all realists are nationalists. True 'realists' would accept that any group can form a state, and claim any territory. The existing 'realist' tradition in IR studies does not. Their 'idealism' consists in limiting state formation to nation states - a very effective device for limiting inter-state conflict.
Normative globalism has one more distinctive characteristic: it is associated with political-philosophical positions, in a way that the pan-nationalisms are not. Formal world federalism is almost always linked to rights-based liberalism, in particular the Anglo-American tradition.  (Some world federalists are convinced that the US constitution must serve as a model for the world). A second area of concern for globalists is environmentalism and eco-ethics. Conversely, green parties often have some inherent sympathy for world government, balanced by sympathy for ethno-nationalism and localism. A third concern is also derived from eco-ethics: transgenerational ethics, in particular global responsibility to future generations.
None of these variants, and none of the claims of normative globalism, are 'ethical' in the sense of morally good. Globalism is not inherently superior: its claims are often however based on this assumption. All the ethical claims can be disputed, as with the arguments for a world state. The most common are arguments from unity as value, from common status, from peace, from common problems and from historical trend.
Size or homogeneity of territory is not an ethical factor in itself, although a minimum size may be a precondition for some state activities. An ethical statement concerning a large territory is not in itself superior to one about a small territory, although it may affect more people. Federalism as norm or ideology cannot in itself justify a single state (and is in any case rarely so used).  A single state is not necessarily or inherently superior to a plurality (or absence) of states.
Being human confers no obligation, to enter into a state with other humans. The same applies to residence on the planet: 'residents of earth' are a category, not a collectivity. No moral obligations derive simply from membership of a category. (Otherwise any randomly listed persons could be declared obligated to each other - merely by being on the same list). However the historical reality is, that certain categories were made into political collectivities - by force. That is almost a definition of classic nationalism. All nation states enforce collective obligations - criminalising decollectivisation as 'sedition', 'rebellion', 'secession', or 'treason'. A world state (even in confederal form) would have to criminalise these also - or it would soon disintegrate. In this sense, it would share the coercive aspects of nationalism.
A world state cannot be justified from the common problems facing humanity. Even if there are such common problems, those facing them are again a category, and not a collectivity. In many cases the commonality is disputed anyway. Typical is the conflict on measures against global warming between industrialised countries, and newly industrialising countries. The older industrial nations are now the main source of pollution, but in 20 to 30 years that position will be reversed. So even where a problem by definition affects everyone, that is not evidence that its solution is collective.
If the argument is, that those who can solve the global problem should form the state, then it implies a global technocracy rather than a global state. Most people will never take any administrative or political decision on any 'global problem'. Humans are not in any real sense a problem-solving political collective, requiring state formation for its proper functioning.
A classic justification of normative globalism, from Saint-Pierre, Bentham and Kant onward, is the argument from peace - 'peace among peoples' or 'global peace'. There is a simple formal objection to this argument. There is not one, but many possible conditions of peace: therefore no single condition can be justified, from peace itself. Most schemes for world peace refer to more than simple absence of war. They introduce other aspects, in effect defining a 'true peace'. The argument is usually circular: "true world peace is X - therefore we must have X to achieve true world peace". Different groups fill in different values for X - for instance government by the UN General Assembly, or North-South transfer taxes. But if this is to be an argument for global government, each group should explain why their particular proposal, is the only true and valid peace.
The emphasis on peace conceals the fact that most nation states, most of the time, are not at war with each other. This reflects a fundamental truth about nationalism: as a universal ideology it is already global, in the sense that there is an almost undisputed world order of nation states. Combine this with the formal equivalence of globalism and nationalism, and it is clear that the issue in globalist peace schemes is not peace. It is a dispute among nationalists about how many states there should be - 180 states, 500 states, or one global state. (In this perspective the co-existence of state-centric and global 'multi-centric sub-systems' which James Rosenau sees as characterising the present, is historically inherent to nationalism. There will be pressures for more nations, pressures for less nations, and pressure for one nation.)  One or more of these numbers may in fact result in peace, but that again is no valid argument, since other non-national combinations might do so too. Formally: no form of state which has historically existed as plural conflicting states may, by reducing its number to one, legitimately claim a monopoly of world territory.
A related historicist argument is that the inevitable trend of world history is to a world state. There is an undeniable long term decline in the number of state or statelike entities,  but neither empirical conclusion nor moral imperative can be drawn from this. It is a logical error - the historicist form of the naturalistic fallacy - to conclude that such trends should be continued. The trend applies in any case to a limited range of state types which have dominated state formation: states based on single ethnic groups or sub-groups, and multi-ethnic empires dominated by a conquering ethnic group.  If for instance state formation had been based on universal religions, the number of states in the last two millennia would have been much smaller, and more stable (compare the map of religions in an atlas with the map of nations). New state types may therefore stop, or reverse, the long term trend to fewer states, or one state. Similarly, processes of globalisation, in whatever sense, may be reversed. 
The historicist claim about falling numbers of states parallels more general claims of historical process, of transition to an era of peace based on globalism in some form. Media, politicians and academics often share the vision, explicit in the work of Hedley Bull, that some form of transition from disorder or anarchy among states takes place in the long term.  Similarly there is a widespread belief in the erosion of the state, meaning the nation state, as a closed container or arena.  At worst there is a mythology of "the Westphalia system of states", to which the evils of nationalism are ascribed: it is then supposed to give way to "global politics".  Similarly the "war system" is supposed to end with the birth of the "global peace system". 
No normative judgment can be derived from such historical metaphors or periodisations, of which there are hundreds of conflicting versions.  Authors cannot consistently emphasise pluralism and diversity, and then reduce history to one or two great transitions: all periodisations are counter-pluralist.  These defects apply especially to cyclic or succession-of-empire theories which predict a global state.  Nevertheless, many people like to believe they are living through a 'great transition', or at the dawn of a 'new era'. This 'Epochenillusion' is itself a historic phenomenon, traceable back to the 16th century. ]
If nationalists first organise centuries of warfare, and then suddenly abandon "the destructive and dismal rationality of Westphalia, Machiavelli and Clausewitz....",  the rest of the world has no obligation to be grateful to them. It certainly does not give them a legitimate claim to the planet.
The argument from peace for cosmopolitanism closely parallels the argument from peace for democracy, the normative version of the "democratic peace proposition".  The error in these arguments is shown by a few examples of propositions:
Even if the premise is correct (that few democracies fight democracies), the conclusions do not follow. Formally: where there is more than one means to secure en end, no single means can be justified by the end. Peace does not justify democracy, unless only democracy brings peace. Peace does not justify a world government, unless only a world government brings peace.
Even more formally, the properties of interactions between entities of a class A cannot a priori determine the properties of interactions between entities of a class B, unless class A is identical to class B. Nor can the interactions in one class determine the properties of entities in another class. Even if 190 nation states are engaged in permanent bloodshed, that still does not mean that 190 non-national states will do the same. Therefore the moral superiority of one kind of state (on whatever scale) to another kind of state cannot be inferred from the moral superiority (on the same or another scale) of the relations between states of the first kind. This applies where the relationships are determined by number (although a single state has no 'relationships' except self-equivalence).
Any possible single-state world will have no inter-state wars: world peace is no argument for any one of these possibilities in particular. Nevertheless normative globalists continue to argue from "peace" for what is clearly a planetary nation state, and so implicitly argue against other world orders (of one or more states). Logically, neither war nor peace, neither respect for sovereignty nor erosion of it, neither intervention nor co-operation, neither plurality nor uniqueness, can justify the nation state. Therefore, they can not justify a planetary nation state.
Aside from such formal objections, there are direct political and social objections to normative globalism in the pro-UN form. (In some recent world federalist literature it is not the UN, but the European Union, which serves as model for a future world government).
Firstly, the UN is the largest organisation in history composed entirely of nation states. As such, it is probably also the most nationalist organisation in history. It is inextricably linked to the idea of nationalism (and incidentally the worst possible organisation, to intervene in nationalist conflicts). It cannot be open to, or objectively consider, territorial alternatives to nationalism.
Secondly, the UN is structurally elitist. Its personnel (especially at higher levels) comes from the university educated upper middle class, itself in some countries a subgroup of a small urban elite. In many cultures, and traditionally in Europe, diplomats were drawn from the aristocracy. The UN has inherited this social inequality, as have the related academic disciplines of international affairs and international law. Students on prestige international exchange programmes in these areas typify this extreme social inequality, yet UN personnel will often be drawn from that group. Worse, despite drawing from all nations, the UN still discriminates racially: the elites within each country over-represent the dominant ethnic group. Immigrant minorities in Europe, or dispersed ethnic minorities in general, have almost zero chance of a UN career. In truth, the UN discriminates systematically, and shows no signs of changing. This in itself disqualifies it as potential basis for any global authority: this point is usually ignored by globalists. In a sense, the United Nations is 'the aristocracy's revenge': they may have lost control of national governments over the last three centuries, but might yet run the world government.
In conclusion, the alternative for a world divided into nation states is not one nation state, but other forms of division. One nation is nationalism, 190 nations are nationalism, federations of nations are nationalism, internationalism is nationalism, and the United Nations are nationalist. No internal arrangement of nationalism can of itself justify it against other '-isms'. The number of states in a world order cannot justify that order. Nor are hybridisations of a class of entities inherently superior to those entities, or others. Transnational movements, international organisations, cross-national exchanges: none are inherently morally good. The claimed moral superiority of political cosmopolitanism and normative globalism is based on logical errors: it is a fiction.
The national world order is distinct from, and in opposition to, other world orders. It claims, and effectively controls, all land surface.
NOTES1 Alexander Demandt Endzeit: Die Zukunft der Geschichte (Berlin: Siedler, 1993); Friedrich Berber Das Staatsideal im Wandel der Weltgeschichte. (München: Beck, 1978). Besides summaries by these authors the history of normative globalism is covered by J. ter Meulen Der Gedanke der internationalen Organisation in seiner Entwicklung 1300-1800 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1917); W. van der Linden The International Peace Movement 1815-1874 (Amsterdam: Tilleul, 1987); Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992). On world citizenship specifically: Derek Heater, Citizenship: the Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education (Harlow: Longman, 1990).
2 Michael Marien 'World futures and the United Nations: a guide to recent literature', Futures 27: 3, 1995, pp. 287-310.
3 Roland Meister Ideen vom Weltstaat und der Weltgemeinschaft im Wandel imperialistischer Herrschaftsstrategieen (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973). The suspicion dates back to Engels: see Heater, Citizenship, p. 172 and p. 234.
4 For criticism of the claimed inevitability of nation-eroding globalism see Fred Northedge, Fred 'Transnationalism: the American illusion', Millennium, Journal of International Studies, 5: 1, 1976, pp. 21-27; Kevin Cox, 'The politics of globalization: a sceptic's view', Political Geography 11: 1993, pp. 427-429; and Anthony D. Smith, 'Towards a global culture?', Theory, Culture, and Society. 7: 1990, 171-191; Anthony McGrew, 'Conceptualizing global politics' in Anthony McGrew et al., eds., Global Politics: Globalization and the Nation State Cambridge: Polity, 1992), pp. 1-28, p. 23.
5 For a recent explicit form of this monopoly claim see Anthony Giddens, 'Brave new world: the new context of politics', in David Miliband, ed., Reinventing the Left (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), p.36. Globalisation is claimed to inevitably restrict the process of state formation: this implicitly leaves nation states intact.
6 Some people still write world constitutions: examples in the pages of "United Planetary Federation": http:// www.upf.org/whatis.htm - or the World Government www Site http://www.webcom.com/~worldgov/
7 Thomas Pogge, 'Eine globale Rohstoffdividende', Analyse und Kritik 17: 2, 1995, pp. 183-208.
8 Ernst-Otto Czempiel, 'Governance and democratization', in James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
11 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); Lynn Miller, Global Order: Values and Power in International Politics, Third Edition (Boulder: Westview, 1994); Richard Falk, On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). Recent non-mainstream cosmopolitanism is reviewed in Heikki Patomäki. 'Emerging Late-Modern reconstructivism', Journal of Peace Research 31: 4, 1994, pp. 451-459. A recent article in the Rechtsstaat tradition is Waldemar Schrekenberger, 'Der moderne Verfassungsstaat und die Idee der Weltgemeinschaft', Der Staat 34: 4, 1995, pp. 503-526.
12 Louis Snyder, Macronationalisms: a History of the Pan-movements (Westport: Greenwood, 1984); Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen (Berlin: Zentral-Verlag, 1931); Jacob Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey: a Study of Irredentism (London: Hurst, 1981); on Islam and nationalism see James Piscatori, Islam in a world of nation-states (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) and 'Islam and world politics', in John Baylis and N. Rengger, eds., Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
13 A short and typical exposition is Lucio Levi, 'European citizenship, cosmopolitan citizenship, and international democracy", The Federalist 35: 2, 1993, pp. 80-86.
14 Richard Falk The Promise of World Order: Essays in Normative International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987); Richard Falk Explorations at the Edge of Time: the Prospects for World Order (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); On Humane Governance, (1995).
15 See C. Colpe, 'Syncretism', in M. Eliade , ed., Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1987).
16 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization as Hybridization (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1992 = ISS working papers, No. 152).
17 Joxerramon Bengoetxea, 'L'état c'est fini?' in M. Karlsson et al., eds., Recht, Gerechtigkeit und der Staat (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1993); Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil (Chatham: Chatham House, 1993), pp. 122-129.
19 Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger, Environmental NGO's in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global (London: Routledge, 1994).
20 V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, Global Gender Issues, (Boulder: Westview, 1993). The authors apply this description to movements, but extend it implicitly to all women.
21 Thom Kuehls, 'The nature of the state: an ecological (re)reading', in Marjorie Ringrose and Adam Lerner, eds., Reimagining the Nation (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993), p. 150.
22 F. Manuel & F. Manuel Utopian Thought in the Western World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 522-525; Brown, International Relations Theory, pp. 23-81.
23 Human rights and transnationalism are linked explicitly in Richard Falk, 'Theoretical foundations of human rights', in Richard Claude and Burns Weston, eds., Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), pp. 29-39.
24 Michael Burgess, 'Federalism as political ideology: interests, benefits and beneficiaries in federalism and federation' in Michael Burgess, ed., Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and Future Directions (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).
25 James Rosenau, The United Nations in a Turbulent World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 11-21; 'Governance, order and change in world politics' in Rosenau and Czempiel, Governance without Government, pp. 1-29.
26 R. Carneiro, 'Political expansion as an expression of the principle of competitive exclusion', in R. Cohen & E. Service, eds., Origins of the State: the Anthropology of Political Evolution (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1978); Christopher Chase-Dunn, 'World state formation: historical processes and emergent necessity', Political Geography Quarterly 9, 1990, pp. 108-130.
27 Anthony D. Smith The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Anthony D. Smith, "A Europe of nations - or the nation of Europe?', Journal of Peace Research 30: 2, 1993, pp. 123-135.
28 Michael Smith, 'Modernization, globalization and the nation state' in McGrew et al., Global Politics, pp. 253-268.
29 Hedley Bull & A. Watson The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977).
30 Peter Taylor 'Beyond containers: internationality, interstateness, interterritoriality', Progress in Human Geography 19, 1995, pp. 1-15; Anthony McGrew, 'Conceptualizing global politics'.
31 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, pp. 74-83.
32 Betty Reardon Sexism and the War System (New York: Teachers College Press, 1985).
33 Johan van der Pot De Periodisering der Geschiedenis: een Overzicht der TheorieŽn ('s-Gravenhage: Van Stockum, 1951); Alexander Demandt Metaphern für Geschichte: Sprachbilder und Gleichnisse in historisch-politischen Denken (München: Beck, 1978).
34 J. A. Schmoll, 'Stilpluralismus statt Einheitszwang - Zur Kritik der Stilepochen-Kunstgeschichte', in Epochengrenzen und Kontinuität (München: Prestel, 1985).
35 See for example Matthew Melko, 'Long-term factors underlying peace in contemporary Western civilization', Journal of Peace Research 29: 1, 1994, pp. 99-113.
36 Frantisek Graus, 'Epochenbewusstsein - Epochenillusion'; Odo Marquard 'Temporale Positionalität - Zum geschichtlichen Zäsurbedarf des modernen Menschen', both in Reinhart Herzog and Reinhart Koselleck, eds., Epochenschwelle und Epochenbewusstsein (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1987).
37 Ken Booth, 'Human wrongs and international relations', International Affairs, 71: 1, 1995, pp. 103-126, p. 119.
38 Democratic peace research is reviewed in Nils Pieter Gleditsch, 'Democracy and Peace', Journal of Peace research 29: 4, 1992, pp. 369-376. The proposition is extended to oligarchic republics in Spencer Weart, 'Peace among democratic and oligarchic republics', Journal of Peace Research 31: 3, 1994, pp. 299-316.
Nation Planet, nationalism link site.